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Abstract
We study the relation between firm growth and managerial incentive provision
under moral hazard when a long-lived firm is operated by a sequence of managers. In
our model, firms replace their managers not only upon poor performance to provide
incentives, but also when outside managers are at a comparative advantage to lead
the firm through a new growth phase. We show how the optimal contract can be
implemented with a system of deferred compensation credit and bonuses, along with
dismissal and severance policies. Firms with better investment prospects have higher
managerial turnover and rely on more front-loaded compensation schemes. Growth-
induced turnover can result in positive severance if the principal needs to incentivize the
manager to truthfully report the arrival of a growth opportunity. Realized firm growth
depends jointly on the exogenous arrival of growth opportunities and the severity of
the moral hazard problem. We also find a new component of agency costs due to the
spillover effect of the tenure of the incumbent manager onto the present value of future
managers’ compensation.
1 Introduction
Firms extract value not only from operating their existing assets, but also from the
expected future profits of their growth opportunities. The latter source of value creation
typically involves implementing major changes of strategy, exploring new markets,
developing new products, adopting innovative production techniques or changing the
organization of labor within the firm. However incumbent managers, for a variety of
reasons, may lack the vision or the skills that are necessary to lead the firm through
a new growth phase. Firms often find that major management changes are needed to
pursue their growth opportunities successfully.
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This paper explores how growth-induced management turnover interacts with the
provision of managerial incentives in a dynamic moral hazard model. We consider a
firm with assets in place and growth opportunities, which is run by a sequence of man-
agers throughout its life-cycle. As in previous studies on optimal long term contracts
with limited liability, firms can use the threat of early termination to discipline their
incumbent managers, i.e., firms often fire their managers after periods of poor perfor-
mance. But in contrast with previous studies, our paper stresses that firms may also
fire their managers despite good performance if a change of management is the best or
only option to seize valuable growth opportunities.
In our model, a risk-neutral manager is hired by a risk neutral, long-lived firm to run
its existing assets. Cash flows are only observable by the manager, who can then under-
report and divert them for his own private benefit. The firm can fire its incumbent
manager at any point in time, and replace him at a cost. Growth opportunities are
stochastic and may arrive in any period. We assume that growth is efficient under
first-best. In our baseline model, growth opportunities are contractible and the firm
needs to replace its current manager in order to pursue a growth opportunity. Upon
taking up a growth opportunity, the firm pays the costs of investing and replacing the
manager, and the scale of its business increases.
We solve for the optimal long-term contract signed between the firm and each of
its successive managers at the time they are hired. As in other papers in the literature
on dynamic moral hazard, a manager’s expected discounted payoff under the optimal
contract, or continuation value, evolves over time and its sensitivity to cashflows is
related to the severity of the agency problem. A key feature in our analysis is that the
continuation value of the firm upon replacing an incumbent manager is endogenous
(equal to the value of the firm under the newly hired manager), and contingent on
the current availability of a growth opportunity. This contrasts with most of the
existing dynamic contracting models where, upon firing the manager, the firm obtains
an exogenously given liquidation value.
Our results in the baseline model are as follows. First, the realized growth of
firms depends both on the technological features of the growth process and on the
severity of moral hazard. This implies that a firm’s corporate governance can be a
key determinant of corporate growth. In our model, two firms with similar growth
opportunities may end up having very different realized growth profiles just because
they differ in the severity of the agency problem they face. A firm plagued with more
severe agency problem may forego a growth opportunity and decide instead to retain
its incumbent management, when the growth opportunity arises after a period of good
performance. We therefore distinguish between two (endogenous) types of firms: low
growth firms that may or may not undertake growth opportunities depending upon the
past performance of the incumbent manager, and high growth firms that undertake all
growth opportunities when they arise. In the former type of firms, underinvestment
adds to the usual inefficiency that, for the sake of ex ante incentive provision, managers
can be fired upon poor past performance in the absence of a growth opportunity.
Second, the probability of replacing an incumbent manager in our model depends
not only on past and current performance, as summarized by the manager’s continua-
tion value, but also on the availability of a growth opportunity. In all firms, the con-
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ditional probability of managerial replacement is higher in states of the world where
a growth opportunity is available. In low growth firms, the performance threshold
being used to determine replacement decision is set at a higher level in these states,
making replacement more likely. In high growth firm, the incumbent management is
systematically replaced when a growth opportunity arises.
Third, we characterize the optimal compensation scheme of incumbent managers,
and determine how the availability of growth opportunities affects managerial compen-
sation. We find that the optimal managerial contract is readily implementable by a
system of deferred compensation credit and bonuses. Deferred compensation is used,
along with the threat of inefficient replacement, in order to provide incentives in the
best possible way. We show that the degree to which firms rely on back-loading of com-
pensation is affected by their growth prospects. Namely, the extent of back-loading
decreases with the quality of firms’ growth opportunities. We also find that severance
is not required under the optimal contract. The reason is that it is more efficient for
the firm to mitigate agency costs by giving zero severance and instead increase the
manager’s promise contingent on him being retained.
Lastly, we identify a new component of agency costs that arises in our framework,
which is due to a form of contractual externality. When a firm offers a contract to a
newly hired manager, it fails to take into account the spillover effect upon the expected
amount of time before hiring future managers and thus the present value of compen-
sation received by all future managers. The agency cost induced by this externality is
naturally larger for low growth firms, where the arrival of a growth opportunity does
not always result in managerial turnover. This externality of the current binding con-
tracts of the firm on its future binding contracts does not arise in earlier papers in the
literature, in which firms are liquidated at an exogenous value upon termination of the
incumbent, and only, manager of the firm.
We consider two extensions of the baseline model. First, we consider a setting where
the arrival of growth opportunities is only observable by the incumbent manager. Under
the maintained assumption that growth entails a change of management, an incumbent
needs to be incentivized to truthfully reveal to the owners of the firm the realization of
a growth opportunity. When the quality of growth opportunities is good enough, the
manager is systematically dismissed when he announces that such opportunity becomes
available, and receives a severance pay contingent on the firm’s performance history
under his tenure. Our analysis therefore contributes to our understanding of why firms
make severance payments to their managers.
In another extension of the baseline model, we consider an environment where firms
can grow with their incumbent managers, possibly at a different cost than when they
grow with a new manager. Whenever it is sufficiently costly to grow with the incumbent
manager, e.g., because realizing a growth opportunity would require paying an army
of external consultants to help the firm reinvent itself, all the results of the baseline
model survive. However, when the costs of growing with the incumbent are sufficiently
low, then the incumbent may grow the firm, but only if his past performance has been
sufficiently good. If instead past performance has been poor, the incumbent will be
dismissed, even though this is ex post inefficient.
Related literature. Our notion that the growth of a firm may require replacing
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the incumbent manager is found in many early contributions to the managerial the-
ory of the firm. Penrose (1959) discusses why firms may operate successfully under
competent managers but may still fail to take full advantage of their opportunities of
expansion. Williamson (1966) elaborates on how management constraints affect the
realized growth of firms. More recently, Roberts (2004) echoes Penrose by emphasizing
the need for different organizational capabilities in the exploration and exploitation of
firms’ investment projects. He discusses a number of business cases where this effect
is prominent. In their empirical study of U.S. firms, Murphy and Zimmerman (1993)
provide evidence that after the hiring of a new CEO, firms engage in a variety of new
investment projects, which materializes in a sharp increase in R&D, advertising, and
capital expenditures. In a repeated moral hazard framework but without optimal con-
tracting, Anderson and Nyborg (2011) study the link between managerial replacement
and firm growth and show how it is affected by the firm’s choice of debt or equity
financing.
Our paper contributes to a recent literature in finance and economics that applies
the tools of optimal dynamic contracting to the study of the firm in the presence of
agency conflicts. The works by Quadrini (2004), Clementi and Hopenhayn (2006),
DeMarzo and Fishman (2007a), Biais et al. (2010), DeMarzo et al. (2011), and
Philippon and Sannikov (2011) explore, as we do, the link between dynamic moral
hazard and investment when investment is contractible.1 Our framework differs from
these papers in several dimensions. The key difference is that in our framework growth
may entail replacing the current manager whereas in these papers the firm retains
its incumbent manager upon growth. Furthermore, we consider growth opportunities
which arrive stochastically, we endogenize the state-contingent “liquidation” value of
the firm, and focus on managerial turnover rather than firm survival. Spear and Wang
(2005) and Garrett and Pavan (2012) study optimal termination policies in settings
where the firm can dismiss their manager and hire a new one from an external labor
market, but they abstract from growth and the economic determinants of turnover
they emphasize are different from the ones in our paper.
The implications of our model are related to the empirical literature on managerial
turnover and firm growth. In the context of venture capital, Kaplan, Sensoy and
Stromberg (2009) find that the management team of firms in their early stages of
growth undergoes high turnover before the IPO. This is consistent with the prediction
in our model that firms with high realized growth have high managerial turnover.
Martin and McConnell (1991), Mikkelson and Partch (1997), as well as a recent paper
by Jenter and Lewellen (2011) study more specifically the links between CEO turnover
and acquisitions. Acquisitions can be seen as a source of value creation, and often
involve target CEOs being either fired or forced to retire early. The implications of
our model are also related to the empirical studies of Murphy (1985, 2001), Yermack
(2006), and Kaplan and Minton (2008) on CEO compensation, severance pay, and their
links with managerial turnover.
Finally, the recent theoretical work on managerial turnover by Eisfeldt and Kuhnen
(2012) echoes our motivation that firms may need different managers at different times,
1He (2008) considers an environment where growth is affected by non-observable effort.
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though it does so in a context without growth. They consider a competitive matching
model without agency conflicts to explore the role of industry conditions in determining
managerial turnover, managerial compensation and the type of CEOs being hired.
The rest of the paper proceeds as follows. Section 2 describes our baseline model.
Section 3 derives the optimal long-term contract, and provides an informal discussion of
its main features. Section 4 provides an illustration in the stationary limit of the model.
Section 5 employs numerical simulations to further analyze the empirical implications of
our model and quantify the effects. Section 6 considers an extension where incumbent
managers have private information about the arrival of growth opportunities. Section 7
considers an environment where the firm can grow with its current manager. Section 8
concludes, and a mathematical appendix includes proofs of some key results.
2 The baseline model
2.1 Setup
We consider a project/firm that generates a stream of risky cashflows {Y1, Y2, ..., YT }
over T periods (we later consider the stationary limit as T goes to infinity). The project
is run by an agent (the manager) who can underreport cashflows and divert them for
his own private benefit. The agent gets λ ≤ 1 for each unit of diverted cash, so that λ
captures the severity of moral hazard. In any period, an incumbent agent can be fired
(at some cost) and replaced by a new agent. For simplicity, we normalize the value
of an agent’s best outside option upon being fired to zero. Agents and principal are
risk-neutral with discount rates ρ and r < ρ, respectively.
The firm cashflow in period t is Yt = Φtyt, where Φt is the size of the firm at
the beginning of period t and yt is independently and identically distributed with
support Y, E(yt) = µ and min(Y) = 0. In each period, with probability q ∈ (0, 1) and
independently from current cashflow realization, the firm has an opportunity to grow.
Growth opportunities are contractible, and the state variable θt ∈ {G,N} describes
whether a growth opportunity is available (θt = G) or not (θt = N) in period t.
Taking up a growth opportunity involves paying some investment cost and hiring a
new manager. Specifically, if a growth opportunity realizes in period t, given an initial
size Φt, the firm can grow to a size (1 + γ)Φt in period t + 1 at a cost of (χ + κ)Φt,
where χ and κ denote the proportional costs of scaling-up and replacing the manager,
respectively.2 If there is no growth opportunity or if an available growth opportunity
is not taken up, the size of the firm remains constant. Figure 1 summarizes the timing
within each period.
The assumption (relaxed later in Section 7) that growth necessarily entails replacing
the incumbent manager is quite natural in circumstances where firm growth requires
a new skill set and/or a change in corporate culture. The incumbent manager, whose
human capital has to some degree become specific to the firm in its current form during
his tenure, will have lost the flexibility to adapt his skills to new requirements. While we
2When considering the stationary limit of the model as T → ∞, we impose that qγ < er − 1 to ensure
finite valuation.
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have in mind drastic changes of the firm, as a modeling convenience we capture this as a
discrete change in firm size, which scales up the distribution of cashflows. Note however
that growth in our model may not involve an increase in physical capital. Instead it
could simply be the result of finding better management causing a permanent increase
in firm productivity.
We focus our analysis on situations where it is first-best efficient to replace man-
agement to take up an available growth opportunity, which in the infinite horizon limit
of the model amounts to the following parameter restriction
γµ
er − 1
> κ+ χ. (1)
Absent a growth opportunity, a manager would never be fired under first best when
κ > 0. As a benchmark, we can define Vt(Φ), the first-best value of the firm in period t
given size Φ, ex-cashflow and before the growth opportunity realization. The sequence
of first-best value functions is given recursively by
Vt(Φ) = q
[
−(κ+ χ)Φ + e−r {(1 + γ)Φµ+ Vt+1[(1 + γ)Φ]}
]
+ (1− q)e−r{Φµ+ Vt+1(Φ)},
where the recursion starts at VT (Φ) = 0, for all Φ, i.e., at the end of period T there
are no further cashflows and the firm expires. In the infinite horizon stationary limit,
the homogenous nature of the model allows us to write V (Φ) = v∗Φ, where
v∗ =
−q(κ+ χ) + e−r(1 + qγ)µ
1− e−r(1 + qγ)
. (2)
2.2 Contracting
We now consider optimal second-best contracting when cashflows are non-verifiable. A
contract is established between the firm and the manager at the outset of his tenure.
When the latter is replaced, the contract is terminated and a new contract is estab-
lished with a new manager. A contract specifies as a function of history (i.e., the
sequence of payments received by the principal, and the history of growth opportunity
realizations), circumstances under which an agent is fired (i.e., history-contingent fir-
ing probabilities), investment and growth, and non-negative cash compensation from
principal to agents. Agents have limited liability, and the principal has deep pockets
implying that he will not pass up growth opportunities because he is cash constrained.
For simplicity, we assume a contractual environment with full-commitment (no renego-
tiation) and we rule out private savings by the agent.3 The amount of diversion is the
only decision over which the agent has control. In searching for an optimal contract, we
restrict our attention to contracts that induce truthful reporting (since λ ≤ 1 diversion
is at least weakly inefficient). An optimal contract is one that gives maximum payoff
to the principal subject to providing a certain payoff to the agent, while satisfying
incentive compatibility and limited liability constraints. We assume that the contract
is designed so as to give an expected discounted value of Φw0 to a manager hired to
run the firm at size Φ.
3DeMarzo and Fishman (2007b), Section 2.1 and Corollary 1, show that if the rate of return available to
the agent is less than or equal to r (i.e., private saving is weakly inefficient), even if allowed to do so, the
agent would have no incentive to use private savings under the derived optimal contract.
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-Byt (Φ, w)
6
Cashflow realization.
Agent reports cashflow to investor.
Bqt (Φ, w)
6
Growth opportunity realizes.
θt ∈ {G,N}.
Bℓt,θ(Φ, w)
6
Replacement/growth decision.
Bct (Φ, w)
6
Agent’s compensation.
Bet (Φ, w)
Figure 1: Intra-period timing
3 The optimal contract
In this section, we characterize managerial compensation, managerial turnover, and
realized firm growth under the optimal contract. Our derivation of the optimal con-
tract follows the approach of DeMarzo and Fishman (2007b).4 In our context, history
can be summarized by two state variables: the current size of the firm Φ, and the
agent’s size-adjusted continuation value w. Given this simplified state space, the op-
timal contracting problem can be solved by dynamic programming. To this end, it is
useful to introduce a number of value functions to keep track of the principal’s dis-
counted expected payoff at different points within a period (as shown in Figure 1).
We let Byt (Φ, w) denote the principal’s value under the optimal contract at the begin-
ning of period t, before cashflow realization, given current size Φ and (size-adjusted)
continuation value w to be delivered to the agent; Bqt (Φ, w) denotes the principal’s
value in period t, after cashflow realization, but before the growth opportunity is re-
alized; Bℓt,θ(Φ, w) denotes the principal’s value conditional on a growth opportunity
being available or not, before replacement and growth decisions; Bct (Φ, w) denotes the
principal’s value after the growth/severance decision has been taken but before com-
pensation to the retained agent, conditional on the firm entering period t + 1 with
size Φ; and Bet (Φ, w) denotes the principal’s value at the end of period t, conditional
on the firm entering period t + 1 with size Φ and with (size-adjusted) continuation
value eρw to be delivered to the manager as of the beginning of period t + 1. Our
assumptions that firm cashflows and costs are all proportional to size guarantee that
these value functions are all homogenous in current firm size.
Lemma 1. All value functions satisfy the following homogeneity property
Bit(Φ, w) = ΦB
i
t(1, w) ≡ Φb
i
t(w), i ∈ {y, q, ℓ, c, e}. (3)
The analysis can therefore be simplified by applying dynamic programming directly
onto the size-adjusted value functions. In the end, an optimal contract is entirely
characterized via a set of rules specifying the evolution of the state variable w, and a
4See Green (1987) and Spear and Srivastava (1987) for early applications of recursive techniques in the
context of dynamic moral hazard. See DeMarzo and Fishman (2007a) and Biais et al. (2010) for applications
involving time-varying firm size.
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set of policy functions specifying the agent’s compensation and the optimal replacement
and growth policies as a function of the current value of w and of whether a growth
opportunity is currently available or not.
3.1 Properties of the optimal contract
We now solve for the size-adjusted value functions, the law of motion for the agent’s
continuation value w, along with the optimal compensation, replacement and growth
policies by backward induction. We provide an informal discussion of the main features
of the optimal contract and its implementation in Section 3.2.
The recursion starts in the final period with bℓT,θ(w) = −w for θ = G,N . Now
consider the construction of bqt+1(w) for t ≤ T − 1 along with the determination of wG
and wN , the continuation promises contingent upon the availability or not of a growth
opportunity, taking bℓt+1,G(w) and b
ℓ
t+1,N (w) as given. We have
bqt+1(w) = maxwG,wN
qbℓt+1,G(wG) + (1− q)b
ℓ
t+1,N (wN ), (4)
subject to the promise-keeping condition qwG + (1 − q)wN = w and limited liability
wθ ≥ 0 for θ = G,N . We describe the solution to this problem below in Proposition 2
after having characterized the continuation value functions bℓt+1,θ.
The beginning-of-period value function is obtained as
byt+1(w) = max
{wq(y)}y∈Y
µ+ E{bqt+1[w
q(y)]}, (5)
where the expectation is taken over the distribution of y, subject to the promise-keeping
condition E[wq(y)] = w, limited liability wq(y) ≥ 0, and incentive compatibility
wq(y) ≥ wq(y˜) + λ(y − y˜), ∀y ∈ Y, ∀y˜ ∈ [0, y]. (6)
The following lemma further characterizes the beginning-of-period value function, as
well as the cashflow sensitivity of the agent’s updated continuation value.
Lemma 2. In any period t, byt is only defined for w ≥ λµ. Moreover,
wq(y,w) = w + λ(y − µ), w ≥ λµ. (7)
The intuition behind Eq. (7) is that in order to induce the agent not to divert, his
continuation value must have a sensitivity λ to his payment to the principal. Hence
the incentive-compatibility condition gives the slope of wq with respect to y, while
the promise-keeping condition gives the level of the schedule. The fact that byt is only
defined for w ≥ λµ comes from the limited liability constraint: indeed, w needs to be
high enough to guarantee that even for the lowest possible cashflow realization, the
continuation value wq(y) consistent with incentive-compatibility and promise-keeping
constraints remains non-negative.5 Given byt+1, the end-of-period value function in
period t is simply given by
bet (w) = e
−rbyt+1(e
ρw), w ≥ e−ρλµ, (8)
where the domain of bet follows directly from that of b
y
t+1.
5Recall that min(Y) = 0. More generally, the lower bound of the domain of by is λ(µ−min(Y)).
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Lemma 3. For t < T − 1, bet is concave in w.
In a Modigliani-Miller world, increasing the agent’s value would merely amount
to redistributing total firm value, and the principal’s value would simply be linearly
decreasing in the agent’s value with a slope of −1. In the presence of moral hazard
and costly replacement, a change in w also affects the principal’s value via its impact
on the likelihood of inefficient firing. Under the contract, the investor is committed to
firing the agent following a string of bad cashflow realizations even though this may be
costly (i.e., ex post inefficient) for the investor. When the manager’s current promise
is low, this ex post bad outcome for the investor is relatively likely. Increasing the
agent’s promise by one dollar actually costs less than one dollar to the principal as this
significantly reduces the prospect of a costly turnover. When instead the manager’s
current promise is relatively high, the prospect of turnover is already slight and the
benefit derived from increasing the agent’s promise is also small.6
3.1.1 Cash compensation
The value function bct captures the principal’s value contingent on the incumbent man-
ager being retained. The problem at this stage is to find the best possible way to
compensate the agent over time, by employing the optimal mix of present versus fu-
ture compensation. Formally, for w ≥ e−ρλµ
bct(w) = max
c,we
−c+ bet (w
e) (9)
subject to the promise keeping condition c + we = w, the limited liability condition
c ≥ 0 and we ≥ e−ρλµ.
Lemma 4. Let wt such that b
e
t
′(wt) = −1. The optimal compensation policy is
ct(w) =
{
0, w ≤ wt,
w − wt, w > wt.
(10)
Therefore, bct(w) = b
e
t (w) for w ≤ wt and b
c
t(w) = b
e
t (wt)− (w − wt) for w > wt.
Lemma 4 states that it is optimal to defer an agent’s compensation until his con-
tinuation value has reached the threshold wt. The optimal compensation threshold is
determined by a basic tradeoff: delayed compensation is preferable because it keeps the
agent’s promise from falling closer to the inefficient termination threshold, while early
compensation is preferable because the agent is more impatient than the principal.
Formally, the compensation threshold wt is determined by comparing the marginal
6In the mathematical appendix, we provide a proof to Lemma 3 which takes into account the impact of a
change of w on future growth prospects, which was ignored in the basic intuition above. The key observation
in the proof of concavity is that at the next but last period before the end of the firm (period T −1), in order
to be able to properly discipline the agent in the last period, there will be circumstances that lead to the
inefficient liquidation of the firm. This implies concavity of the value function bℓT−1,N . One can then show
recursively that if the payoff function to the principal at one stage of the firm is concave, the construction
of the optimal contract guarantees that the payoff to the principal at earlier stages is also concave.
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cost for the principal of present versus deferred compensation. By compensating the
agent with ∆c in period t, the principal’s value is −∆c + bet (w − ∆c). For a small
∆c, this can be approximated by bet (w) +∆c(−1− b
e
t
′(w)), which shows that non-zero
compensation is optimal if and only if bet
′(w) < −1.
3.1.2 Replacement and growth
We can now proceed with the construction of bℓt,θ for θ = G,N . At this stage, given
the realization of θ and the manager’s continuation value w, the contract specifies the
firing probability pt,θ(w), the updated continuation value w
c
t,θ(w) that the incumbent
manager gets upon being retained, and a possible severance pay st,θ(w) awarded if
he is not. Note that there is no growth opportunity available such that θ = N , the
principal’s continuation value (adjusted by current size) upon replacing the incumbent
manager is:
ℓt,N = e
−rbyt+1(w0)− κ. (11)
If instead a growth opportunity is available in period t such that θ = G, the
principal’s continuation value upon hiring a new manager depends on whether the
opportunity is taken up or not. We restrict our attention to situations where the
cost of growth (captured by χ) is sufficiently small relative to the benefit of growth
(captured by γ), so as to rule out the uninteresting case where the firm would never
grow under second best. Hence
ℓt,G = e
−r(1 + γ)byt+1(w0)− (κ+ χ) > ℓt,N , (12)
and pt,G(w) can also be interpreted as the probability of growing conditional on a
growth opportunity being available.
The optimal severance and replacement/growth policies are obtained by considering
the following constrained maximization problem, separately for θ = G and θ = N :
bℓt,θ(w) = max
p,s,wc
p(ℓt,θ − s) + (1− p)b
c
t(w
c) (13)
subject to the promise keeping condition ps + (1 − p)wc = w, the limited liability
condition s ≥ 0, wc ≥ e−ρλµ, and p ∈ [0, 1]. To analyze this problem, it is useful to
introduce for θ ∈ {G,N},
δt,θ = sup
{
bct(w)− ℓt,θ
w
: w ≥ e−ρλµ
}
, (14)
and
wt,θ =
{
inf{w ≥ e−ρλµ : bct
′(w) ≤ δt,θ}, if δt,θ > −1,
∞, otherwise.
(15)
Graphically, δt,θ and wt,θ are determined by finding the line of maximum slope relating
the termination point (0, ℓt,θ) to the curve representing b
c
t(w).
7 The slope of this line
gives δt,θ, while wt,θ is defined as the value of w at the intersection/tangency point if
δt,θ > −1 and wt,θ =∞ otherwise.
7See Figures 3 and 4.
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Proposition 1. For any realization of θ ∈ {G,N}, the optimal replacement policy can
be described as follows:
(i) if δt,θ > −1, the probability of the incumbent agent being replaced is
pt,θ(w) =
{
1− w/wt,θ, 0 ≤ w < wt,θ,
0, w ≥ wt,θ.
(16)
The agent receives no severance pay upon being fired, st,θ(w) = 0, ∀w < wt,θ, and
his continuation value upon being retained is
wct,θ(w) =
{
wt,θ, 0 < w < wt,θ,
w, w ≥ wt,θ,
(17)
Hence
bℓt,θ(w) =
{
ℓt,θ + δt,θw, 0 ≤ w ≤ wt,θ,
bct(w), w ≥ wt,θ.
(18)
(ii) if δt,θ ≤ −1, the incumbent manager is replaced with probability one independently
of the agent’s promised value, pt,θ(w) = 1 for all w ≥ 0. Upon being replaced, the
manager receives st,θ(w) = w, and
bℓt,θ(w) = ℓt,θ − w, ∀w ≥ 0. (19)
We will proceed under the assumption that replacement in the absence of growth
is always ex-post inefficient, hence δt,N > −1 and part (i) of Proposition 1 applies
in the absence of a growth opportunity. As further discussed in Section 3.2, whether
δt,G is greater or lower than −1 essentially depends on the quality of growth oppor-
tunities relative to the cost of pursuing them (captured by the parameters γ and χ,
respectively).8
3.1.3 Contractual response to the arrival of a growth opportunity
We now close the derivation of the optimal contract by characterizing how the agent’s
continuation payoff is affected by the realization of a growth opportunity. This involves
solving the optimization problem entering in the definition of bqt , as stated in (4).
Proposition 2. For a given promise w, the contingent continuation payoffs (wG, wN )
in period t are characterized as follows:
(a) If δt,G > −1
(i) if w < (1− q)wt,G, wG = 0 and wN = w/(1 − q);
(ii) if (1− q)wt,G ≤ w < wt,G, wG = (w − (1− q)wt,G)/q and wN = wt,G;
(iii) if wt,G ≤ w ≤ wt, wG = wN = w;
(iv) if w > wt, any combination of wG and wN such that wG ≥ wt, wN ≥ wt,
and qwG + (1− q)wN = w can be chosen.
8Note that (14) along with ℓt,G > ℓt,N implies δt,G < δt,N .
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(b) If δt,G ≤ −1
(i) if w < (1− q)wt, wG = 0 and wN = w/(1 − q);
(ii) if w > (1 − q)wt, any combination of wG ≥ 0 and wN such that wN ≥ wt
and qwG + (1− q)wN = w can be chosen.
Figure 2 illustrates part (a) of Proposition 2, that is, in cases when the agent
might not be replaced when a growth opportunity is available. For low levels of the
agent’s promise post cashflow realization, the promise is allocated entirely to the state
of the world where no growth opportunity is available. This is clearly optimal since
a higher promise in the no-growth state reduces the likelihood of inefficient turnover,
while a lower promise in the growth state increases the probability that growth be
pursued if a growth opportunity becomes available. Note that even once the agent’s
post-cashflow promise w is high enough to ensure that the agent will be retained in the
no-growth state, allocating the promise entirely to this state remains optimal so as to
ensure that any available growth opportunity is taken up with probability one. When
w reaches (1 − q)wG, keeping the agent’s promise in the no-growth state pegged at
wt,G while allocating any marginal increase in the agent’s promise to the growth state
becomes optimal as the marginal cost of increasing the promise in the no-growth state
is equalized to the marginal cost of increasing the promise in the growth state, where
the latter is coming from a reduction in the probability of efficient turnover.9 For higher
levels of the post-cashflow promise w, the continuation promise wθ is independent of
whether growth is available or not. The agent is retained for sure, and by keeping the
agent’s promise at w the principal equalizes the marginal cost of the promise across
the growth and no-growth states. A noticeable implication of Proposition 2 is that the
arrival of a growth opportunity is weakly bad news for the incumbent manager, i.e.,
wG(w) ≤ wN (w) for all w.
10
A number of interesting observations emerge by combining Proposition 1 and Propo-
sition 2. For any value of the post-cashflow promise w, the probability of replacement
is higher in the presence of a growth opportunity than in its absence. Furthermore, if
w is sufficiently low, namely w < (1 − q)wt,G, the probability of replacing the agent
to take up an available growth opportunity is equal to one, independently of whether
part (a) or (b) of Proposition 1 applies in the growth state. In addition, we have the
following result:
Corollary 1. There always exists an optimal contract under which the agent receives
no severance pay upon being replaced.
Corollary 1 establishes that severance pay plays no material role in the optimal dy-
namic contract.11 Positive severance pay can never arise in the absence of a growth
9Note that in part (a-ii) of Proposition 2, the contingent promises are set so that any surviving agent
will face the same incentives, i.e., will carry a promise of wt,G into the compensation phase of the period.
10Part (a-iv) of Proposition 2 shows that for very high values of w, any lottery (wG, wN ) such that
bℓ ′G (wG) = b
ℓ ′
N (wN ) = −1 is optimal. In part (b) of the proposition, since the agent is systematically replaced
upon realization of a growth opportunity, the marginal cost of an increase in wG is constant. Setting wG = 0
is strictly optimal as long as bℓ ′N (w/(1− q)) > −1.
11Corollary 2 in Section 6 shows that this result hinges crucially on the contractibility of growth opportunity
realizations.
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opportunity, or even upon realization of such an opportunity as long as δt,G > −1. In-
deed in both circumstances, part (i) of Proposition 1 applies. The only circumstance,
though somewhat artificial, where severance pay could arise under an optimal contract
is if δt,G ≤ −1, and the firm has had good recent performance so that the agent’s
promise after cashflow realization is above (1− q)wt. In that case, combining part (ii)
of Proposition 1 and case (b-ii) of Proposition 2, it appears that the principal is indif-
ferent between giving a non-zero severance pay to the agent contingent on θt = G, or
zero severance and a higher continuation payoff contingent on θt = N .
3.2 Discussion of the optimal contract
Having formally derived the optimal contract in our setting, it is useful to summarize it
informally and to discuss how it can be implemented in practice. The optimal contract
between the firm and its manager sets out the conditions under which the manager
will be compensated during his tenure at the firm and also those which will lead to
his leaving the firm. These terms and conditions are chosen to maximize the value of
payoffs to the firm’s owners subject to incentivizing the manager to truthfully report
realized cashflows. Payments and retention/replacement decisions are made over time
as a function of the value of promised deferred payments, wt, which evolves under the
influence of the firm’s operating performance and growth opportunity realizations. The
contractual features in force at time t are summarized in the threshold values wt,G,
wt,N , and wt. The manager receives qualitatively different treatment depending upon
whether wt is above or below these thresholds.
The threshold values wt,G and wt,N may be thought of as replacement thresholds. As
the replacement decision is made after the availability of a growth opportunity (or lack
thereof) has been observed, these thresholds are conditioned on such opportunity being
available or not. wt,N is the dismissal threshold when there is no growth opportunity
available. If the manager’s current promise lies above this threshold, wt > wt,N , then
he knows that he will be retained. If rather the operating performance has been so
poor that the manager’s promise is below the threshold, wt < wt,N , then he is at risk
of being fired. In effect, he is given a lottery whereby with some probability he will
be dismissed and will receive no further payments from the firm. If he survives this,
he stays with the firm and is awarded a continuing promise that is increased to the
dismissal threshold amount, wt = wt,N . The intuition for why there is zero severance
pay is that by reducing the payment upon dismissal to zero the principal is able to
increase the promise to the agent if he survives the dismissal threat, thus reducing the
agency problem faced by the firm subsequently. The probability of dismissal is chosen
so that the lottery is fair, i.e., its expected value equals the agent’s promise wt.
The logic of the dismissal decision when the growth opportunity is available is
similar to the above; however, it is made by comparing the agent’s promise to the
growth dismissal threshold wt,G which is higher than that without growth (wt,G >
wt,N ). If the manager’s promise is below the threshold wt,G he is given a fair lottery
in which, if he is dismissed, he leaves the firm with no further compensation, and
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if he survives, he is given a continuing promise which is increased to wt,G.
12 The
risk of dismissal is weakly higher upon realization of a growth opportunity than if
no such opportunity arrives — controlling for performance history. If the manager’s
promise is above the threshold wt,G he knows he is safe. Notice though that retaining
the incumbent in the face of a growth opportunity is inefficient, i.e., the firm passes
up a positive NPV project. A form of agency-induced managerial entrenchment can
therefore arise in our setting following periods of sustained good performance.13
The threshold value wt can be thought of as the bonus threshold. In any period, if
the agent has survived the replacement phase, he may be entitled to cash compensation.
If the adjusted promise of a surviving agent lies above the bonus threshold such that
wt > wt, a bonus is awarded in that period equal to the excess wt−wt, and the agent’s
continuing promise is reduced to the threshold amount wt. Otherwise, if wt ≤ wt,
the agent receives no compensation in that period and continues with his promise wt,
which is adjusted to eρwt at the beginning of the next period as a fair compensation
to the agent for his payoff being delayed.
The promise that the agent takes into a period undergoes two adjustments prior
to the replacement and compensation phases. First, upon the report of the cashflow
for the period, the agent’s promise is adjusted linearly as described in equation (7),
the cashflow sensitivity being set so as to provide the right incentives for the agent not
to divert. Then upon the realization of θ the promise is further adjusted as described
in Proposition 2. By allocating a given post-cashflow promise w between the no-
growth state (wN ) and the growth state (wG) the principal is effectively determining
the probabilities of inefficient and efficient turnover. When the cashflow performance
has been poor and w is low, it is optimal to allocate the promise entirely to the no-
growth state, so as reduce the chances of a costly turnover while increasing those of
efficient turnover. Past the point where a costly turnover is avoided for sure, it is when
the marginal cost of increasing the promise in the no-growth state becomes equal to
that of increasing the promise in the growth state (due to a reduction in the probability
of taking up an available growth opportunity) that the principal starts allocating some
of the promise to the times where a growth opportunity realizes. For higher values of
the post-cashflow promise, the continuation promises are independent of the growth
opportunity realization, as the agent will be retained for sure and the firm will not
grow in any state of the world.
The optimal contract calls for zero severance pay to a dismissed manager under most
circumstances (in particular if a manager is not dismissed upon growth), and positive
severance is always at least weakly dominated by no severance (Corollary 1). Severance
is suboptimal because it has no agency cost-reducing benefit once the agent leaves the
12As further discussed below, when the benefit of growing is great enough (δt,G ≤ 1), the incumbent man-
ager is systematically replaced when a growth opportunity is available, independently of past performance
(wt,G = ∞). In that case, there exists an optimal contract featuring no severance, though as already men-
tioned, the contract could also be designed so that the leaving manager receives positive severance if past
performance has been sufficiently good (see Corollary 1).
13This possibility only arises when δt,G > −1, and is in contrast with the result of Casamatta and Guembel
(2010) who find that moral hazard, combined with reputational concerns and managerial legacies, leads to
managerial entrenchment after poor performance.
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firm. By reducing the severance and increasing the promise to the agent in the case
he survives, the agent can be made as well off but the principal and be made better
off because the prospect of a subsequent costly liquidation is made more remote. Our
zero-severance result relies crucially on the assumption that growth opportunities are
both exogenous and contractible. We show in Section 6 that growth-induced turnover
can result in positive severance when the principal has to incentivize the agent to
truthfully report the arrival of a growth opportunity.
The optimal contract we have just described can be implemented fairly directly
using standard employment contracts, and there is some evidence that features of our
optimal contracts are used in practice. The bonus calculation in this contract is very
much like the typical contract that was found by Murphy (2001) in his study of the
bonus contracts of large U.S. firms in 1997. The key parameters he identifies are the
performance target, the pay-performance-sensitivity (pps), and the bonus threshold.
In our contracts, these are µ, λ, and wt respectively.
Our contract specifies an indefinite term with both the manager and the firm having
the right to terminate at will.14 Actual employment contracts are often written in this
way.15 In practice, it is not unheard of that following a period of poor performance
when the manager was thought to be under threat of dismissal, the firm instead retains
the manager and gives him an improved compensation package as a vote of confidence.
This is analogous to the award of deferred compensation of wθ −w when the manager
survives a dismissal threat.
Our analysis implies that it is useful to distinguish two categories of firms depending
upon the quality of their growth prospects, both in terms of the frequency of arrival
of growth opportunities and of their attractiveness when they become available. The
tenure of an incumbent manager will be heavily dependent upon the type of firm he
is running. A high growth firm is one that will undertake growth any time it has an
opportunity independently of the firm’s past operating performance, thus generating
a lot of growth-induced turnover. Other firms, which for simplicity we call low growth
firms even though in practice they may grow quite fast, do not always take up an
available growth opportunity. Instead, if past performance has been good enough
and the manager has accumulated a high promised compensation, they will retain
the current manager and keep operating assets at the current scale.16 Proposition 1
shows that the distinction between high and low growth firms depends crucially on
δt,G defined by Eq. (14). Low growth firms are characterized by δt,G > −1, whereas
High growth firms satisfy δt,G ≤ −1.
17 High growth firms and low growth firms behave
in dramatically different ways. While high growth firms always seize an opportunity
to invest and grow, fully realizing their growth potential, low growth firms do not
14Our setup could easily be extended to incorporate a positive reservation value for the agent. With zero
reservation value and limited liability, inducing the agent to remain in the contract is never an issue.
15Of course, some employment laws may constrain this, e.g., by imposing a mandatory notice period which
may vary with the tenure.
16Note that in both types of firms, the probability of an agent being dismissed conditional on θ = N
weakly increases with poor (past and current) performance.
17In Section 4.3, we provide a mapping of high growth vs. low growth firms in the parameter space in the
stationary limit of the model.
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systematically take up available growth opportunities, thus wasting part of their growth
potential. Hence, for the latter firms, an important source of agency cost is under-
investment. For low growth firms, the probability of taking a growth opportunity,
pt,G(w), is decreasing in w. That is, the better has been the operating performance
recently, the less likely that the firm will take up a growth opportunity. These firms
do not take up growth opportunities for high w because the overall cost of taking up
the growth opportunity is too high.18
4 Optimal stationary contract
We now consider our model in the stationary limit where T → ∞. This is a useful
simplification because the key features of the optimal contract, adjusting for changes
of scale as the firm grows, will be constant over the life of the firm. This allows us
to better understand the relationship between these contract features and the deep
underlying characteristics of the firm, in particular, the severity of managerial moral
hazard and the frequency of growth opportunities.
To do this, we solve numerically for the value functions and associated replacement,
growth, severance and compensation policies by iterating backward until convergence
for a large value of T . When considering the stationary limit of the optimal contract,
we drop all time subscripts. We assume size-adjusted cashflows are independently,
identically and uniformly distributed on {0, 1, 2, ..., 20}, with mean µ = 10. The moral
hazard parameter is λ = 0.9. Discount rates for the principal and the agent are such
that er − 1 = 6.5% and eρ − 1 = 7%. The cost of firing and replacing a manager is
equal to 2% of annual mean cashflow (κ = 0.2), while the investment cost required for
the firm to scale up is set to 20% of annual mean cashflow (χ = 2). We set the scale
adjusted reservation compensation for a new manager at w0 = 14. Other parameter
values to be specified are q and γ, capturing the likelihood and the magnitude of growth
opportunities, respectively.
4.1 High growth and low growth firms
Our analysis in Section 3.1 shows that the optimal stationary contract is entirely sum-
marized by three threshold values wN , wG and w. Consider first the case where q = 0.1
and γ = 0.25. In this case, the optimal stationary thresholds are wN = 8.42, wG =∞
and w = 26.06. The fact that wG =∞ indicates that it is optimal to grow and replace
the agent with probability 1 whenever a growth opportunity is available. That is, this
is a high growth firm. Figure 3 represents the corresponding stationary value functions.
Note that, bℓG(w) decreases linearly with slope −1 and lies above b
c(w) for all w indi-
cates graphically that this is a case of high growth. The agent’s compensation threshold
w = 26.06 means that an agent who enters the job with an expected discounted pay-
off of w0 = 14 must experience a sustained run of good cashflow realizations before
receiving any cash compensation.
18This result contrasts with DeMarzo and Fishman (2007a) who find that investment is increasing in the
agent’s promise because the return on investment is high then.
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Suppose instead γ = 0.1, while all other parameters are kept the same. The optimal
stationary thresholds become wN = 8.42, wG = 18.06 and w = 33.29. Having reduced
the rate at which the firm is allowed to grow upon arrival of a growth opportunity, we
now have a firm which does not take up efficient growth opportunities systematically
when available, but only if w is below the threshold wG = 18.06. This is a low growth
firm. Figure 4 shows the stationary value functions in this case. Note that, in this
case bℓG(w) initially decreases linearly with slope greater than −1 and is tangent to
bc(w) at wG = 18.06. Note that in the bonus threshold in the low growth benchmark
firm is higher than in the high growth benchmark (33.29 versus 26.06). Later when we
simulate the model we will see that on average compensation will arrive much later for
the agent in this lower growth case.
4.2 Sensitivity of contract terms
The realized earnings and growth performance of firms are the result of managers’
and owners’ responses to cashflow shocks and to the arrival of growth opportunities,
and these reactions will be shaped by the terms of the contract as set out in the pay-
performance sensitivity and in the thresholds, wN , wG and w. Thus understanding
how these thresholds are affected by changes in the deep parameters of the model is
an important step toward understanding how the earnings and growth experience of
firms is determined.
Figure 5 depicts the three thresholds as functions of the severity of moral hazard,
λ, and the arrival growth opportunity frequency, q, for a firm with a finite wG, that
is, for a low growth firm. The understanding of wN , the dismissal threshold in the
absence of growth opportunities, is quite straightforward because here we have an
analytical formula: wN = e
−ρλµ. That is, the non-growth dismissal threshold is
linearly increasing in λ and independent of q. Intuitively, in the face of increased moral
hazard, the principal will increase the dismissal threshold, thereby increasing the risk
of disciplinary dismissal.
Next consider the impact of λ on the bonus threshold, w. It is increasing in λ
reflecting an increased benefit of deferred compensation. This is because the inefficient
termination threshold is higher and the pay-performance sensitivity increases, implying
that it takes a shorter run of poor performance for the no-growth dismissal threat to
be active.
To understand the effect of increasing λ on wG, recall that an increase in this
threshold means the agent’s promise is more likely to be below it, which in turn means
that the probability that the firm will take a growth opportunity and fire the manager
increases. That is, there is a positive relationship between wG and conditional prob-
ability of growth. In light of this, a higher λ results in a higher wG because this has
two benefits. There is a higher probability that the firm will undertake the attractive
growth opportunity. And if no growth opportunity arrives, agent continues with a
higher promise, w = wG, which makes subsequent inefficient liquidation less likely.
We turn next to the impact of q on w and wG, again for low growth firm. A higher
q causes a fall in the bonus threshold, w, implying that cash payouts will be made
following a shorter run of good performance. This follows because, a higher q implies
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higher unconditional probability of early termination, with no severance pay. Thus in
order to deliver the reservation value, w0, ex ante, the cash compensation needs to be
paid earlier. Furthermore, for the same reason, in order to increase the probability of
getting to the bonus threshold the growth dismissal threshold, wG, decreases because
this decreases the probability of dismissal, conditional on θ = G.
Finally, for high-growth firms, by definition wG =∞. The sensitivities of wN and
w are similar to those in the the low-growth case and for similar reasons. Again, in
our framework, wN = e
−ρλµ. The bonus threshold w is increasing in λ and decreasing
in q, as is the case for low-growth firms. w falls with an increase in q because the
marginal cost of earlier bonus payments decreases as q increases. This is because as q
increases it is more likely that a growth opportunity will arrive soon, in which case it
will be taken up for sure. Therefore the likelihood of inefficient replacement is reduced
and the marginal benefit of deferred compensation is reduced.
4.3 What makes a firm grow fast?
Our baseline examples in Section 4.1 show that two firms that differ only in the size of
the growth opportunity will have very different contracts for top management. These
differences translate into very different policies toward growth opportunities with high-
growth firms undertaking all opportunities that present themselves and low-growth
firms undertaking opportunities only if incumbent management is not performing well.
It is also the case that differences only in agency costs may result in very different
growth experiences. To see this, consider an example of two firms that have the same
size of their growth opportunities (γ = .125), the same probability of having a stochastic
growth opportunity q = 10%, and only differ in the degree of moral hazard λ. All other
parameters are as in our baseline cases. In this example, our model predicts that the
firm with λ = 0.5 grows at an average rate of 1.25%. This is because it is a high-growth
firm that undertakes all the growth opportunities that arise. Meanwhile, the firm with
λ = 1.0 grows at an average rate of around 0.41%.19 Stated otherwise, suppose the
two firms start out life with identical scale of operations. Fifty years on, t = 50, the
expectation is that the firm with low agency problems will have a scale (measured by
the mean cashflow rate) that is 52% larger than the high agency cost firm.20
This holds for other parameters as well. That is, we may have two firms that
differ only slightly in their deep parameters, with one a high-growth firm and the other
a low-growth firm. Figure 6 depicts regions of the parameter space corresponding
to high-growth firms and low-growth firms. All parameters are set as in the second
baseline case (low-growth firm) of Section 4 except for the two parameters depicted in
the diagram.
To summarize, small differences in parameters can result in dramatically different
growth and turnover behavior. Growing firms need a good flow (high q) of good growth
opportunities (high γ) for expanding markets and improving technology. They need to
19The latter statement is based on simulations.
20Note that an improvement in corporate governance, if it induces a fall in λ, can potentially eliminate
agency-induced entrenchment.
18
manage transitions well (low κ, low χ). And they need to keep agency problems under
control, for example, through increased monitoring (low λ).
5 Turnover, compensation timing, agency costs
5.1 Simulating the model
We now simulate the model to understand its implications for management turnover
and the relative importance of deferred compensation. Simulations also allow us to
assess the importance of the agency costs due to the contracting imperfections present
in this framework.
Specifically we draw repeatedly a sequence of cashflows and growth opportunity
realizations, keeping track of compensation, growth and termination decisions as re-
quired by the optimal contract. We then characterize these histories using a variety of
summary statistics. We focus on three statistics that are of particular interest. First
we calculate the average longevity or ‘tenure’ of managers, which is inversely related to
the replacement frequency. Second we calculate the unconditional probabilities of effi-
cient termination (i.e. fire the agent to undertake growth) and inefficient termination
(i.e. fire the agent without growing) as the corresponding realized sample frequencies.
Third, to measure the extent to which the optimal contract relies on deferred compen-
sation, we calculate the average duration of the agent’s compensation conditional on
the agent receiving non-zero compensation during his tenure in the firm. This is calcu-
lated as the weighted average tenure years of the agent’s realized payments with weights
calculated as the ratio of discounted cashflow to the sum of discounted cashflows.
For example, consider the results for the benchmark cases given in Section 4.1. For
the high growth firm with γ = 0.25, average tenure of an agent is 8.6 years. The average
probability of efficient termination is 10% per year, reflecting the fact that for a high
growth firm any available growth opportunity is undertaken. The probability of ineffi-
cient termination is about 1.57% per year. And the average duration of compensation
is 7.1 years.
In contrast for the low growth firm with γ = 0.1, the average tenure is 109 years.
The probability of inefficient termination is 0.25% which is lower than the probability
of efficient termination (0.66%). The average duration of compensation is 20.4 years.
Comparing results for the two cases, we see that high growth firms receive compensation
earlier than on average do agents in low growth firms.
5.2 Comparative statics
In this section, we further explore predictions from our model in terms of its compar-
ative statics with respect to some key parameters. Specifically, we solve our model for
alternative values of these parameters and then simulate the model assuming the same
realizations for underlying cashflow shocks and growth opportunities. We record the
histories of management turnover, whether turnover takes place for growth or for dis-
ciplinary reasons, and the compensation histories for each of the firm’s managers. The
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parameters we vary are q, the probability of having a stochastic growth opportunity,
and λ, the severity of agency problems. The default values of these parameters take
on when the other parameter is varied are q = 0.1 and λ = 0.9. Other parameters are
as in Section 4.1.
5.2.1 Management turnover
In our model managers are replaced either to facilitate growth or because a history of
poor operating results leads to dismissal. The exact conditions under which managers
are replaced are sensitive to both the growth prospects of the firm and to the severity
of agency problems faced by the firm.
Representing the quality of the growth prospects by the frequency of arrival of
growth opportunities, q, we show the sensitivity to this parameter of average manager
tenure. This is depicted in the left panel of Figure 7 for a high growth firm with
γ = 0.25. From the figure we see that as the probability of growth opportunity in a
year rises from 5% to 25% the average tenure of the agent declines from 15 years to
something under 4 years. A similar negative sensitivity to increases in q holds for low
growth firms (e.g., with γ < 0.1), with the difference that, for a given q, the average
tenure is much higher.
Thus tenure falls and turnover rises for firms with better growth prospects. To our
knowledge this hypothesis has not been submitted to direct empirical testing. How-
ever, there is some indirect evidence which is supportive of the hypothesis. Specifically,
Mikkelson and Partch (1997) compare top management turnover intensity in two suc-
cessive five-year periods with very different mergers and acquisitions activity. They
find that in the active take-over period of 1984-1988, 33% of firms in the sample un-
derwent complete management changes (i.e., replaced all of the president, CEO and
Chairman); whereas this intensity was only 17% in the subsequent period 1989-1993
when take-over activity was low. Interestingly their notion of complete management
corresponds better to our model which associates turnover and major changes of direc-
tion than does most of the literature which has focused exclusively on CEO turnover.
While they do not specifically make a link of management turnover and firm growth,
the two periods they cover coincide with very different experiences of firm growth and
investment. Specifically, in the 1984-88 period U.S. annual non-residential investment
spending increased 28%; whereas, between 1989 and 1993 it increased only 12.5%.21
In the right panel of Figure 7 we see the consequences of increasing the severity of
managerial moral hazard. As the rent extraction efficiency (λ) of the agent rises the
average longevity declines. This is a reflection of the fact that the optimal contract
relies more heavily on the threat of termination in the face of more severe moral hazard.
Again, a similar pattern is found for low growth firms as well.
5.2.2 Efficient and inefficient replacement probabilities
As already noted, turnover may occur for growth or for discipline. These two kinds
of managerial turnover are affected differently by changes in the firm’s underlying
21Based on annual U.S. National Income Statistics.
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characteristics. To distinguish these effects, we calculate the average frequency of
these two types of turnover in the simulated histories and plot these as functions of q
and λ in Figure 8. The top row pertains to the high growth case, with γ = 0.25 as
above. In high growth firms the unconditional probability of replacement for reasons
of growth are higher than the probability of disciplinary replacement. Since all growth
opportunities are taken up in these firms, this frequency increases linearly in q.
The effect of more severe agency problems on dismissal frequencies in high growth
firms is given in the upper right panel of Figure 8. Since all growth opportunities
are taken up, changes in λ have no effect on the efficient dismissal probability. The
probability of inefficient dismissal is slightly increasing in λ. This reflects an increased
reliance on the termination threat when moral hazard is more severe.
The sensitivities of dismissal probabilities for low growth firms are given in the
bottom row of Figure 8. As for high growth firms, efficient dismissal probability is
increasing in q. Recalling that in low growth firms, growth opportunities are taken
only when incumbent managers have been performing poorly, we see that more such
managers are eliminated through growth when growth arrives more frequently (i.e., as
q increases). In the right panel, the probability of inefficient replacement increases with
increasing λ reflecting greater reliance on the dismissal threat (increased wN ). Thus
more managers are replaced before any growth opportunity arrives, implying a decline
in the unconditional efficient dismissal probability, as seen in the figure.
5.2.3 Compensation duration
To assess the consequence of changing parameters for the reliance on front loading of
compensation, we have calculated the realized duration of compensation from bonuses
during agents’ tenure. These sensitivities are given in Figure 9. From the top row
we see that for both high and low growth firms an increase in q reduces the duration
of compensation. That is, when growth opportunities arrive more frequently, firms
optimally rely on more front-loading of compensation. The effect works through the
lower bonus threshold for high-growth firms.
The second row of Figure 9 shows the effect of increasing λ. For both high growth
firms and low growth firms the average duration of compensation rises as λ rises. The
reason for this is that a higher λ increases bonus threshold, w. Managers receive
compensation only after a sustained run of good performance.
Again, to our knowledge, there are no empirical studies that directly test whether
these effects on the timing of compensation hold. However, Kaplan and Minton (2008)
have studied the evolution of top CEO turnover since 1990, a period that saw very
rapid increases in the amount of top management compensation. They find evidence
of more rapid turnover, especially after 2000. They argue that the observed increases
in CEO pay are compensation for shorter tenure. This is consistent with our theory
in which high growth will be associated with shorter tenure and more front-loading of
compensation.
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5.3 Agency costs
In this section we assess the loss of value caused by the non-contractibility of cashflows.
In our framework with repeated growth options, the first-best value of the firm is the
expected present discounted value of all cashflows net of dismissal and investment costs
when the firm undertakes all growth opportunities that present themselves but does
not dismiss any manager in the absence of growth. Under the optimal contract in
the face of non-contractible cashflow, the firm will fall short of this value for several
distinct reasons. First, as in previous studies of agency in a dynamic setting, under
the optimal contract the firm will dismiss managers for disciplinary reasons following
a series of poor cashflow realizations even though this is ex post inefficient. Second,
there is an inefficiency due to the reliance on deferred compensation when mangers
are more impatient than investors, ρ > r. Third, under the optimal contract the firm
will sometimes retain an incumbent manager and pass-up growth opportunities even
though growth is ex post efficient. Finally, there is a more subtle form of agency costs
which we have not emphasized in our discussion until now. This is due to the fact that
at the time of agreeing a contract with an incoming manager the firm does not take
into account the spill-over effect on the timing of future managers’ hiring. As noted in
the Introduction, this effect is absent in the previous literature.
Specifically, the second best value of the firm is the expected present value of all
cashflows that accrue to the principal and to all managers who successively run the firm
under optimal contracts as set out in Proposition 1. Two subtleties should be noted
in calculating this second best value. First, cashflows to agents are discounted at the
agents’ discount rate, ρ; whereas, investor cashflows are discounted at rate r. Since
ρ > r, the promise to an agent is worth less to the agent than it costs the firm. Second,
the calculation of agent cashflows includes payments to all agents, both current and
future. Thus in the stationary case we can write the size-adjusted, beginning-of-period
second-best value of the firm as
v(w) = by(w) + w + f(w), (20)
where f(w) denotes the expected discounted value of payoffs to future agents as a
function of the current agent’s promised value, w.22 To assess the extent of agency
costs, the total value of the firm under the optimal contract v(w) can be compared to
the beginning-of-period, first-best value of the firm, µ+ v∗, for v∗ defined in (2).
Figure 10 depicts values under the second best optimal contact for the high growth
(γ = 0.25 in the top panel) and low growth firms (γ = 0.1 in the bottom panel) as set
out in Section 4.1. The left panel gives the value for the principal and the incumbent
agent, b(w) + w. The middle panel gives the present value of compensation to future
agents who are not party to the current contract but who are affected by the current
22The last term, f(w), does not appear in the earlier contributions to the literature on optimal long-term
contracts where there is a single agent and the “liquidation” value of the firm is exogenous. For instance,
the liquidation value of the firm is set equal to zero in Biais et al. (2007). In their welfare analysis DeMarzo
and Fishman (2007b) take the liquidation value to be equal to an exogenous fraction of the first-best value.
Garrett and Pavan (2012) do identify a tendency toward excessive retention of managers which implies a
loss of welfare somewhat akin to what we capture in f(w).
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contract and the current promise to the incumbent agent, f(w). The right panel gives
the sum of all these components, that is, the second best value of the firm defined
above, v(w) = b(w)+w+f(w). These can be compared to the corresponding first best
values (µ+v∗) of 260.39 and 189.37, respectively. The second-best value function v(w)
shows only little sensitivity to the current agent’s promise w. Agency costs amount
to roughly 5% of first-best value for the high growth case and about 13% in the low
growth case. That is, agency costs represent about fifteen months of expected cashflows
for the high-growth firm and about thirty-four months of expected cashflows for the
low-growth firm. The principal reason why agency costs are less for the high-growth
firm is because it undertakes all investment opportunities, even under the second-best
contract, whereas a low-growth firm suffers from under-investment.
In the left panels of Figure 10 we see that for both high and low growth firms
the combined value to the principal and the incumbent manager is increasing in the
promise to this manager. This reflects the relaxation of agency problems affecting
the two parties to the current contract, and this is an effect already seen in previous
dynamic agency models. Interestingly, the second-best firm value, taking into account
the effect on future managers, is not increasing and concave in w. This is seen in
the right panel of Figure 10 where, for both high-growth and low-growth firms, v(w)
becomes decreasing beyond a certain point.
Why? The answer is that the second best contract is designed so as to maximize
investor value subject to the incentive compatibility condition (6) vis a` vis the in-
cumbent agent. This condition does not take into consideration the consequences for
future agents. Thus incentivizing the current agent with a higher promise may come at
the cost of reducing payoffs to future agents. Specifically, if the current agent will be
succeeded by future agents at stochastic stopping times τi, i = 1, 2, 3, ..., the expected
present values of the amounts they will receive, E[e−ρτiΦτiw0], are both missing and
affected by the current w since this affects the distribution of stopping times.
As can be seen from the central panel of Figure 10, the present value of payoffs to
future agents, f(w), is decreasing in the current promise. In the case of low growth firms
there are two separate effects. A higher promise w tends to decrease the probability
that the incumbent will be replaced for disciplinary reasons. It is also reduces the
probability of replacing the agent in order to undertake growth. In the case of high
growth firms, by definition, growth opportunities are undertaken whenever they appear,
independently of w. Thus only the first effect is present. This is the reason that the
value f(w) is less sensitive to changes in w in the high growth case than in the low
growth case. Note that as w increases from 10 to 30, f(w) declines by about 5 for the
high-growth firm and by about 9 for the low-growth firm.
6 When growth opportunities are non-verifiable
In this section, we consider an extension of our baseline model where the incumbent
manager is privately informed about the arrival of a growth opportunity, i.e., θ is only
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observable by the manager.23 This corresponds to situations where the incumbent
manager knows what transformations could improve the firm’s future prospects, but
is also aware that he would be unable to implement these transformations himself.
Analyzing the optimal second-best contract in this extended environment clarifies the
extent to which our no-severance result in Section 3 relies on the contractibility of
growth opportunities.
We are looking for the optimal contract that implements truth telling, i.e., under
which the incumbent truthfully reports not only cashflows but also the arrival of a
growth opportunity. The additional truth telling constraint enters in the definition of
the value function bqt (w) given b
ℓ
t,G and b
ℓ
t,N . Namely, we now have
bqt (w) = max
wG,wN
qbℓt,G(wG) + (1− q)b
ℓ
t,N (wN ),
subject to promise keeping qwG + (1− q)wN = w, limited liability wθ ≥ 0, and
wG ≥ wN . (21)
The inequality constraint (21) guarantees that the agent has no incentive to conceal
the arrival of a growth opportunity lest it should result in his dismissal. It should be
noted that the contingent continuation promises (wG, wN ) as described in Proposition 2
typically violate incentive compatibility. Instead, we have the following result:
Proposition 3. When the realization of θt is only observable by the manager, the
continuation promises (wG, wN ) under the optimal contract satisfy
wG = wN = w (22)
for any given post-cashflow promise w, and bqt (w) = Eθ[b
ℓ
t,θ(w)]. All other aspects
of the recursive representation of the optimal contract are obtained along the lines of
Section 3.
The principal would rather have set wG ≤ wN if the truth telling constraint (21) was
removed, hence that constraint holds as an equality under the optimal contract. An
immediate implication of Proposition 3 is the following:
Corollary 2. When only managers can observe the realization of a growth opportunity,
the managers of high growth firms (i.e., when δG < −1) are replaced with probability
one upon realization of a growth opportunity and receive a severance pay equal to their
post-cashflow promise.
Corollary 2 shows that positive severance can become an essential part of the optimal
contract when growth opportunities are non-contractible. This is in contrast with
the no-severance result obtained in the baseline model (Corollary 1). Note however
that positive severance pay only arises in high growth firms. In low growth firms,
23Effectively, the incumbent has private information about how the firm’s expected productivity under his
tenure compares relative to what it could be under new management. This feature is also present in Inderst
and Mueller (2010), and Garrett and Pavan (2012).
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dismissed managers leave the firm with zero severance under any circumstance. It
should also be noted that the optimal contract does not set some fixed severance
amount ex ante. Instead, severance is contingent on performance history and increases
with past performance.
Yermack (2006) provides evidence that the payment of severance packages to de-
parting CEOs is a widespread practice. His findings provide support to the “damage
control” view of severance pay (as a means of avoiding dismissed managers making
trouble for the firm under the management of their successors) as well as to “bonding
theories” of severance pay (as a means of providing insurance to the managers for their
human capital). Among the latter type of explanation, Inderst and Mueller (2010)
show that severance pay may be part of the optimal contract to discourage managers
from concealing adverse information. Our analysis suggests a related but alternative
interpretation, namely, that severance pay is the consequence of the need to incentivize
the incumbent CEO to not bury the news that value-improving transformation of the
firm has become available when such news may lead to his dismissal.
7 When the incumbent can grow the firm
The maintained assumption in our analysis so far was that in order to pursue an
opportunity to grow, the incumbent manager had to be replaced. In this section, we
consider an environment where upon the arrival of a growth opportunity, the firm can
grow either with a new manager or with the incumbent manager. Growth opportunities
are contractible. The analysis clarifies under which circumstances our conclusions from
the baseline model hold, and how they need to be modified in other cases.
We let χi denote the (size-adjusted) cost of taking the growth opportunity with
the incumbent manager, and χn the cost of growing with a new manager.24 The
derivation of the optimal contract follows the same logic as in Section 3.1, except for
the construction of bℓG.
25 The key novel feature of the optimal contract in the extended
environment is that, whenever the firm retains an incumbent manager at a time a
growth opportunity is available, it now needs to choose optimally whether to grow or
not. Formally, we define
b¯ℓG(w) = max
p,s,wc
p(ℓG − s) + (1− p)b
c(wc) (23)
subject to the promise keeping condition ps + (1 − p)wc = w the limited liability
condition s ≥ 0, wc ≥ e−ρλµ, and p ∈ [0, 1]. We also define
bˆℓG(w) = max
p,s,wc
p(ℓG − s) + (1− p)[(1 + γ)b
c(wc)− χi] (24)
subject to the alternative promise keeping condition ps + (1 − p)(1 + γ)wc = w. The
value function b¯ℓG corresponds to the case where upon retaining its incumbent manager
24We assume that γµ/(er−1) > min(χi, χn+κ), so that the first-best policy in steady state involves taking
all growth opportunities. Under first best, the firm grows with new managers if and only if χn + κ < χi.
25For notational convenience, we drop all time subscripts in this section.
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the firm does not take up the growth opportunity. The value function bˆℓG corresponds
to the alternative case where, if retained, the incumbent manager does implement
the growth opportunity.26 Note that ℓG, the continuation value upon replacement
contingent on θ = G, is generally defined as27
ℓG = max{e
−r(1 + γ)by(w0)− κ− χ
n; e−rby(w0)− κ}. (25)
Whenever the cost of growing with a new manager χn is sufficiently small (relative
to γ), if a new manager is hired at a time a growth opportunity is available, growth
is implemented (ℓG > ℓN ). For high values of χ
n, the firm never grows with a new
manager (ℓG = ℓN ).
7.1 When the incumbent never grows the firm
We start our analysis of the extended model by noting that under some circumstances
the firm will never grow with an incumbent manager and that in this case the results of
Sections 3-5 go through. Indeed if it is prohibitively costly to grow with an incumbent
manager (χi very large), a firm would never choose to do so and would only ever grow
with new managers — as long as the costs of doing so (captured by χn) are reasonably
low. Our analysis of the baseline model directly applies to such configurations.
Proposition 4. When χi is large, the firm never grows with an incumbent manager
(bℓG = b¯
ℓ
G). If moreover χ
n is relatively small, all the results of Section 3 apply.
7.2 When the incumbent sometimes grows the firm
In the remainder of this section, we turn our attention to situations where the cost of
growing with the incumbent χi is sufficiently low relative to the gains from growth, so
that it can be optimal for the firm to sometimes grow with an incumbent manager.28
Our next proposition describes the construction of the value function bℓG and the asso-
ciated replacement and severance policies conditional on θ = G in such configurations.
Note that the value function bℓN along with the policy functions pN (w), sN(w) and
wcN (w) are obtained along the lines of Proposition 1, as before.
Proposition 5. When χi is low, the firm sometimes grows with incumbent managers.
Taking the continuation value function bc as given, let wG ≡ (1 + γ)e
−ρλµ and
bˆc(w) ≡ (1 + γ)bc
(
w
1 + γ
)
− χi, w ≥ wG. (26)
26Note that in that case, the probability of managerial replacement pG(w), which appears as p in (24), no
longer coincides with the probability of growing conditional on θ = G.
27In levels, we have LG(Φ) = max{e
−rBy[(1+γ)Φ, w0]−Φ(κ+χ
n); e−rBy(Φ, w0)−Φκ} and Bˆ
ℓ
G(Φ, w) is
obtained by maximizing p{LG(Φ)−Φs}+(1− p){B
c[(1+ γ)Φ, wc]−χiΦ} over severance s ≥ 0 adjusted for
current size Φ, dismissal probability p ∈ [0, 1], and continuation promise wc ≥ 0 adjusted for expanded size
(1+γ)Φ. The promise keeping condition is pΦs+(1−p)(1+γ)Φwc = Φw. The definition of the continuation
value ℓG and value function bˆ
ℓ
G, both adjusted for current firm size, follow from homogeneity.
28We focus on situations where bˆℓG > b¯
ℓ
G everywhere, ignoring situations that could potentially arise where
bˆℓG(w) > b¯
ℓ
G(w) if and only if w is above some threshold.
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The probability of managerial turnover conditional on θ = G is
pG(w) =
{
1− (w/wG), 0 ≤ w < wG,
0, w ≥ wG.
(27)
Severance pay conditional on θ = G is sG(w) = 0, ∀w, and the continuation value to
the retained manager (scaled by next period size) is
wcG(w) =
{
wG/(1 + γ), 0 < w < wG,
w/(1 + γ), w ≥ wG.
(28)
Finally
bℓG(w) = bˆ
ℓ
G(w) =
{
ℓG + δGw, 0 ≤ w < wG,
bˆc(w), w ≥ wG,
(29)
where the slope of bˆℓG for w < wG is given by δG ≡
bˆc(wG)−ℓG
wG
.
Proposition 5 shows that when χi is sufficiently low, if a growth opportunity arises
after a period of sustained good performance, the incumbent manager is retained and
grows the firm for sure (Eq. 27). If instead the recent performance of the firm has been
relatively poor, the incumbent manager is at risk of being dismissed. If he survives this
threat, he is allowed to grow the firm. If not, he leaves the firm with zero severance.
Whether or not new management grows the firm depends on their ability to implement
the transformations that are required. If χn is high, the firm installs the new manager
but passes up the available growth opportunity. When χn is relatively low, growth
is implemented for sure, either with or without the incumbent. Note however, that
growing with a new manager is inefficient relative to first best when χn+κ > χi. Finally,
note that whenever the firm does take up a growth opportunity with an incumbent
manager, his expected discounted cashflow remains unchanged. The adjustment to the
promise wcG(w) appearing in (28) is merely due to the fact that by definition, end-of-
period promises wc are scaled by next-period firm size, whereas wℓG is scaled by current
size.
Figure 11 depicts stationary value functions bℓG and b
ℓ
N for parameter values such
that Proposition 5 applies, i.e., the firm grows with the incumbent manager if a
growth opportunity arises after sustained good performance.29 Threshold values are
wN = 8.41, wG = 9.25, and w = 44.93. In that example ℓG > ℓN , i.e., if turnover
occurs at times a growth opportunity is available, the firm will grow with its new man-
ager. Moreover, δN = 0.77 > δG = 0.69, which captures the fact that replacement is
slightly more inefficient ex-post in the absence of growth. The relative position of the
value functions bℓG and b
ℓ
N shows that firm value increases upon arrival of a growth
opportunity.
To close the analysis, we need to characterize the adjustment of an agent’s expected
payoff to the arrival of a growth opportunity — which determines whether managers
benefit or not from the arrival of a growth opportunity. The next proposition is analo-
gous to Proposition 2, accounting for the fact that the marginal benefit of an increased
29Here we assume χi = χn = 2, κ = 7.5, γ = 0.1, q = 0.2, and the other parameters are as in the
benchmark case of Section 4.1, i.e., λ = 0.9, er − 1 = 6.5%, eρ − 1 = 7%, µ = 10 and w0 = 14.
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promise to the manager conditional on the arrival of a growth opportunity is typically
increased when the incumbent sometimes ends up implementing growth.
Proposition 6. For a given promise w, the contingent continuation payoffs (wG, wN )
in period t are characterized as follows.
(a) for low χn so that δN > δG,
(i) if w < (1− q)wN , wG = 0 and wN =
w
1−q ;
(ii) if (1− q)wN ≤ w < qwG + (1− q)wN , wG =
w−(1−q)wN
q
and wN = wN ;
(iii) if qwG + (1− q)wN ≤ w ≤ (1 + γq)w, wG =
1+γ
1+γqw and wN =
1
1+γqw;
(iv) if w > (1+ γq)w, any pair (wG, wN ) such that wG ≥ (1+ γ)w, wN ≥ w, and
qwG + (1− q)wN = w is optimal.
(b) for high χn so that δN < δG,
(i) if w < qwG, wG = w/q and wN = 0;
(ii) if qwG ≤ w ≤ qwG + (1− q)wN , wG = wG and wN =
w−qwG
1−q ;
and (iii) and (iv) of case (a) apply for higher values of w.
The general logic that runs through Proposition 6 is the same as in Proposition 2,
namely that in the optimal contract the principal puts his promise to the agent where
it counts most. Figure 12 illustrates this logic under the assumption that the cost of
growing with the new manager χn is low, so that δN > δG and part (a) of Proposition 6
applies. For the purpose of this example, we take wN = 10, wG = 14, q = .25, and
γ = .4. For low values of w, the entire promise is allocated to the no-growth state so
as to minimize the chances of a relatively inefficient turnover in the absence of growth.
However, once the post-cashflow promise w has risen sufficiently so that wN (w) = wN ,
the agent will be retained for sure in the no-growth state. The concern then becomes
to avoid inefficient turnover upon growth, and therefore any marginal increase in w
is allocated to the growth state while keeping the no-growth promise pegged at wN .
Finally when the post-cashflow promise has risen to qwG + (1− q)wN , the incumbent
will be retained for sure. Above that threshold, any promise to the agent is delivered
in the form of a lottery (wG, wN ) that equalizes the marginal scale-adjusted cost to the
principal across the growth and no-growth states, bℓ ′G (wG) = b
ℓ ′
N (wN ).
Figure 13 illustrates Proposition 6 under the assumption of high χn so that part (b)
applies. Starting at low values of w, the post-cashflow promise is allocated entirely to
the growth state until it is sure that the incumbent will be retained for sure given a
realization of the growth opportunity. Then for higher w the incumbent’s no-growth
promise takes on positive values, and so forth. Notice that in case (b) where new
managers are relatively bad at growing the firm, the arrival of a growth opportunity
is always better for the incumbent than news of no-growth. This is opposite of the
benchmark model where Proposition 2 shows that the arrival of a growth opportunity
is always weakly bad news for the agent.
Together with the dismissal thresholds wG and wN , the updating of the agent’s
promise conditional on θ outlined in Proposition 6 determines how the probability of
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managerial turnover is affected by the realization of a growth opportunity, for a given
cashflow history. Figure 14 exhibits dismissal probabilities conditional on post-cashflow
promise and on the realization or not of a growth opportunity. Note that in situations
where the incumbent is at a comparative advantage at growing the firm (bottom panel
of Figure 14), for low values of the post-cashflow promise, the arrival of a growth
opportunity reduces the probability of dismissal. This is in contrast with the baseline
model.
To conclude this subsection, we illustrate the optimal history-contingent compen-
sation and turnover policies by way of a simple numerical example, for the parameter
values used in Figure 11.30 First, we illustrate under which circumstances the firm finds
it optimal to grow with the incumbent manager. Second, we illustrate how managerial
turnover is affected by past and current cashflow realizations and the availability of
a growth opportunity. Table 1 presents the evolution of the contractual promise to
the incumbent manager for a particular path of scale adjusted cashflows and growth
opportunity realizations. At the beginning of the episode we consider, the manager
is still running the firm at its initial size, and has accumulated a high promise as a
consequence of sustained good performance. His promise wℓN is much higher than the
dismissal threshold, but not high enough to warrant a bonus. Thus he continues into
period t = 7 carrying a promise that has been augmented from previous period to take
into account the manager’s rate of time preference, ρ. A good cashflow realization
leads to an upward adjustment of the agent’s promise, and when a growth opportunity
then presents itself, the promise is increased still further. Given the high promise level,
the manager is retained and is allowed to grow the firm. Notice that his scale-adjusted
promise is reduced (from wℓG = 42.75 to w
c = 38.86) to reflect that in the future he will
be running a larger firm and therefore will be facing a high expected cashflow implying
higher compensation (i.e., his expected payoff is kept at the same level). Subsequently,
the firm is operated at a scale of 1.1 and following another good cashflow in period
t = 8 the agent has accumulated a sufficiently high promise to be awarded a bonus.
After period t = 8, the firm goes through several periods of sustained poor per-
formance, and the manager starts period t = 14 with an expected discounted payoff
wy = 12. After another poor cashflow realization, his promise falls at a low point of
wq = 6.60. Inefficient termination is looming, and case (a-i) of Proposition 6 applies.
If a growth opportunity arrived, the agent would be dismissed with certainty with zero
severance; on the other hand, with a contingent continuation promise wℓN raised to 7.33
the manager has a higher chance of surviving the dismissal stage in case no growth
opportunity arises, i.e., the most inefficient form of turnover is made less likely. In our
example, no growth opportunity arises in period t = 14, but the agent’s promise is
still below the dismissal threshold wN = 8.41, and therefore he is at risk of being fired
with no severance (with 13% chance). The challenged manager survives the dismissal
threat and finds his promise increased to the no-growth dismissal threshold.
The firm performance in the next period (t = 15) is not good enough for the
manager to be sure to keep his position (wq < qwG+(1− q)wN = 8.49). Case (a-ii) of
30As noted above, under these parameters replacement is more inefficient ex-post in the absence of a
growth opportunity (δN > δG), and part (a) of Proposition 6 applies.
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Proposition 6 now applies since wq > (1− q)wN = 7.57. If no growth opportunity had
materialized in that period, the manager would have been safe (wℓN = wN ). However,
given the realization of a second growth opportunity, he is again at risk of being fired
(with 43% chance). The manager is dismissed and leaves the firm without severance
pay after a tenure of 15 periods. A new manager is hired to run the firm at a size of
1.21 (indeed χn is relatively low, and it is therefore more beneficial for the firm to take
up growth with its new manager than passing it up).
Table 1: An illustration of the optimal contract for low χi
Period t 6 7 8 ... 14 15
Size Φt 1 1 1.1 — 1.1 1.1
Promise wyt 30 36.55 41.58 — 12 9.00
Cashflow yt 15 13 17 — 4 9
Promise wqt 34.50 39.25 47.88 — 6.60 8.10
Growth option θt N G N — N G
Promise wℓt,θ 34.16 42.75 47.41 — 7.33 5.30
Replacement proba p 0 0 0 — 0.13 0.43
Promise wc 34.16 38.86 47.41 — 8.41
Cash compensation c 0 0 2.48 — 0
Promise we 34.16 38.86 44.93 — 8.41
To summarize the insights from Section 7, in our model extended to allow for the
endogenous choice of whether an incumbent or a new manager will grow the firm, we
first find that when the cost of growing with the incumbent manager (χi) are sufficiently
high, we recover all the results we found in our benchmark model where we assumed
only a new manager is able to grow the firm (Proposition 4). Conversely, when the
costs of growing with the incumbent are sufficiently low, then the incumbent may grow
the firm, but only if his past performance has been sufficiently good (Proposition 5).
In this latter case we find that dismissing the manager is ex post inefficient both in the
absence of a growth opportunity and in its presence, but this possibility of inefficient
termination is needed to mitigate moral hazard and incentivize truthful reporting.
8 Conclusion
In this paper we explore the relationship between managerial incentive provision and
growth in a dynamic agency model of the firm. In contrast with previous studies,
we consider a long-lived firm with stochastic growth opportunities run by a sequence
of managers over time. In this setting managerial turnover may occur not only to
discipline management but also to facilitate growth.
Our framework produces new insights on managerial compensation, turnover, and
firm growth. We show how optimal contracts in firms with growth opportunities can
be implemented with a system of deferred compensation credit and bonuses that are
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similar to those found in practice. Firms with very good growth prospects tend to rely
less on back-loading of compensation than firms with poor growth prospects. When
growth opportunities are contractible, granting severance pay to dismissed managers
is (at least weakly) suboptimal under the optimal contract because it has no agency
cost-reducing benefit once the agent leaves the firm. However growth-induced turnover
can result in positive severance if the principal needs to incentivize the manager to
truthfully report the arrival of a growth opportunity. The growth trajectory of a firm
depends on the severity of agency problems as well as the quality of its growth oppor-
tunities. When growth entails a change of management, growth can be forsaken after
periods of good performance. When instead incumbent managers are able to imple-
ment growth, they only do so when past performance has been sufficiently good. When
past performance has been poor, firms grow with new managers. Finally, we identify a
new component of agency costs which relates exclusively to managerial turnover, which
is due to the spillover effect of the length of an existing managerial contract onto the
present value of all future contracts signed by the firm.
In our framework, growth opportunities are taken as exogenous. It would be inter-
esting to explore optimal incentive provision when the agent can control the rate at
which growth opportunities realize. If taking a growth opportunity implies a change of
management, an incumbent would need to be given proper incentives to increase the
likelihood of growth opportunities, or not to sabotage the growth prospects of the firm.
Managers may also need to allocate their efforts between producing cashflows from as-
sets in place and developing new opportunities for growth. There may be a trade-off
between these two types of activities in that they may both require top management
time but also because they use different management skills.
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A Appendix
Proof of Lemma 1: Non scale-adjusted value functions are defined recursively as
follows. Given Bℓt+1,G(Φ, w) and B
ℓ
t+1,N (Φ, w), we have
Bqt+1(Φ, w) = max
wG,wN≥0
qBℓt+1,G(Φ, wG) + (1− q)B
ℓ
t+1,N (Φ, wN ), (30)
subject to qwG + (1− q)wN = w. Then
Byt+1(Φ, w) = max
{wq(y)}y∈Y
Φµ+ Ey{B
q
t+1[Φ, w
q(y)]} (31)
subject to promise-keeping condition Ey[w
q(y)] = w, limited liability wq(y) ≥ 0, and
incentive-compatibility constraint
wq(y) ≥ wq(y˜) + λ(y − y˜), ∀y ∈ Y,∀y˜ ∈ [0, y]. (32)
Note that the limited liability and incentive-compatibility constraints imply that Byt+1
is only defined for w ≥ λµ. Now, given Byt+1, we can define
Bet (Φ, w) = e
−rByt+1(Φ, e
ρw), w ≥ e−ρλµ (33)
Next
Bct (Φ, w) = max
C,we≥0
−C +Bet (Φ, w
e) (34)
subject to C + Φwe = Φw. Note that the first argument in functions Bc and Be
is the beginning-of-next-period size, which has already been determined, and cash
compensation C is not size-adjusted. We can also define
Lt,N (Φ) = e
−rByt+1(Φ, w0)− κΦ, (35)
Lt,G(Φ) = e
−rByt+1((1 + γ)Φ, w0)− (κ+ χ)Φ, (36)
and
Bℓt,θ(Φ, a) = max
p,S,wc
p(Lt,θ(Φ)− S) + (1− p)B
c
t (Φ, w
c) (37)
subject to pS+(1−p)Φwc = Φw, S ≥ 0, p ∈ [0, 1], and wc ≥ e−ρλµ. The homogeneity
result and the definition of the scale-adjusted value functions as they appear in Sec-
tion 3.1 follows directly from the observation that in the last period BqT (Φ, w) = −Φw.
Then given the homogeneity of BqT , the homogeneity of B
y
T follows, and homogeneity
of earlier value functions obtains recursively.
Proof of Lemma 3: Our goal here is to show how the concavity of bet arises for
t < T − 1. For that purpose, we need to go through the detailed construction of the
value functions within period T−1. Our starting point is that in the last period byT (w) =
µ−w, for w ≥ λµ, which in turn implies beT−1(w) = e
−rµ−eρ−rw, for w ≥ e−ρλµ. Since
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the slope of beT−1 is strictly below −1, the solution of the constrained maximization
problem in (9) involves setting we = e−ρλµ and c = w − e−ρλµ. Therefore,
bcT−1(w) = e
−ρλµ+ (1− λ)e−rµ− w, w ≥ e−ρλµ. (38)
We can now analyze bℓT−1,N . The relevant continuation value upon replacement is
ℓT−1,N = e
−rby(w0)− κ = e
−rµ− (e−rw0 + κ). (39)
Note that w0 ≥ λµ implies that ℓT−1,N < e
−ρλµ+ (1− λ)e−rµ, which in turn implies
that δT−1,N > −1 and b
ℓ
T−1,N is piecewise linear and globally concave, with a kink
at wT−1,N = e
−ρλµ. The same characterization applies to bℓT−1,G if δT−1,G > −1;
otherwise bℓT−1,G is simply linearly decreasing with slope −1. Furthermore, note that
ℓG,T−1 > ℓN,T−1 implies δT−1,G < δT−1,N . Consider now the constrained optimization
problem in (4). Given our previous characterization of bℓT−1,N and b
ℓ
T−1,G, we know
the maximum is reached (though not necessarily uniquely) by setting wG = 0 and
wN = w/(1 − q). Therefore we can write
bqT−1(w) = qℓG,T−1 + (1− q)b
ℓ
T−1,N
(
w
1− q
)
. (40)
This further implies that bqT−1 is piecewise linear and globally concave, with slope
δT−1,N > −1 for w < (1− q)wT−1,N and slope −1 for w > (1− q)wT−1,N , with a kink
at (1− q)wT−1,N . We now turn to the function b
y
T−1 as defined in 5. Using Lemma 2,
we can write
byT−1(w) = µ+
∫
bqT−1(w + λ(y − µ))dF (y), (41)
where F denotes the cumulative probability distribution of size-adjusted cashflows.
Consider two promises wA and wB greater or equal to λµ, and for α ∈ (0, 1), define
wC = αwA + (1− α)wB . Note that
α
∫
bqT−1(wA + λ(y − µ))dF (y) + (1− α)
∫
bqT−1(wB + λ(y − µ))dF (y)
=
∫
[αbqT−1(wA + λ(y − µ)) + (1− α)b
q
T−1(wB + λ(y − µ))]dF (y)
≤
∫
bqT−1[α(wA + λ(y − µ)) + (1− α)(wB + λ(y − µ))]dF (y)
=
∫
bqT−1[(αwA + (1− α)wB) + λ(y − µ)]dF (y).
Therefore αbyT−1(wA) + (1 − α)b
y
T−1(wB) ≤ b
y
T−1(wC), and b
y
T−1 is concave. Further
inspection shows that byT−1 is strictly concave for w < (1 − q)wT−1,N + λµ, and de-
creases linearly with slope −1 above that threshold. The concavity of beT−2 follows
directly. That concavity is preserved in earlier periods can be established using similar
arguments.
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Proof of Proposition 2: We drop time subscripts for notational convenience and
define the function Vw(wG) = qb
ℓ
G(wG) + (1− q)b
ℓ
N [wN (wG, w)], where
wN (wG, w) =
1
1− q
(w − qwG). (42)
For any w ≥ 0, we consider the problem
max
wG∈
[
0,w
q
] Vw(wG). (43)
Note that V ′w(wG) has the sign of b
ℓ ′
G (wG) − b
ℓ ′
N [wN (wG, w)]. Consider first the case
where δG > −1 and wG <∞, as depicted in Figure 4. For w < (1− q)wG, V
′
w(0) < 0;
indeed wN (0, w) = w/(1 − q) < wG and therefore b
ℓ ′
N (wN (0, w)) > δG. Hence we have
the corner solution wG = 0 and wN = w/(1 − q). For w ≥ (1 − q)wG, the first-order
optimality condition V ′w(wG) = 0 is satisfied at wG = w. Indeed wN (w,w) = w,
and bℓ ′G (w) = b
ℓ ′
N (w) since b
ℓ
G and b
ℓ
N both coincide with b
c in that range. Setting
wG = wN = w is the unique solution when w ∈ [(1 − q)wG, w] since Vw is strictly
concave over that range. However for w > w, the maximum of Vw is reached at any
wG ≥ w such that wN (wG, w) ≥ w. This comes from the fact that b
c is linear over
that region. Consider now the case where wG = ∞ and b
ℓ
G decreases linearly with
slope −1. This case is as depicted in Figure 3. For w < (1 − q)w, V ′w(0) < 0; indeed
wN (0, w) < w and therefore b
ℓ ′
N (wN (0, w)) > −1. Hence we have the corner solution
wG = 0 and wN = w/(1−q). However for w > (1−q)w, the maximum of Vw is reached
at any wG ≥ 0 such that wN (wG, w) ≥ w.
Proof of Corollary 2: By definition of a high growth firm, part (b) of Proposition 1
applies for θ = G, i.e., sG(wG) = wG and we know from Proposition 3 that wG = w.
Proof of Proposition 5: Consider the constrained optimization problem in (24). For
given w > (1 + γ)e−ρλµ, the objective function evaluated at the candidate solution
p = 0, s = 0 and wc = w/(1 + γ) is equal to bˆc(w), where bˆc is defined in (26). Note
that the lower bound of the domain of bˆc follows directly from the lower bound of the
domain of bc. All achievable payoffs are within the convex hull of (0, ℓG) and the payoff
frontier bˆc.
Proof of Proposition 6: The argument of the proof relies crucially on the slopes
of the value functions bℓG and b
ℓ
N . When χ
i is low and bℓG = bˆ
ℓ
G, then for w > wG,
bℓ ′G (w) = bˆ
c′(w) = bc′(w/(1 + γ)). Then we apply the same logic as in the proof of
Proposition 2
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Figure 2: Promises contingent on realization of growth opportunity: low-growth benchmark
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Figure 3: Value functions for high growth firm (γ = 0.25)
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Figure 4: Value functions for low growth firms (γ = 0.1)
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Figure 5: Threshold sensitivities: low growth firm
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Figure 6: High growth and low growth regions of parameter space
41
0.05 0.1 0.15 0.2 0.25
4
6
8
10
12
14
q
Pe
rio
ds
0.7 0.75 0.8 0.85 0.9
8.8
8.9
9
9.1
9.2
9.3
9.4
λ
Pe
rio
ds
Figure 7: Average tenure in high growth firms
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Figure 8: Average dismissal rates
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Figure 10: Second Best Values for high growth firms (top) and low growth firms (bottom)
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Figure 12: Promises contingent on realization of growth opportunity: δN > δG
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Figure 13: Promises contingent on realization of growth opportunity: δN < δG
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Figure 14: Extension: turnover probability as a function of post-cashflow promise and growth
opportunity realization (top panel corresponds to the case δN > δG; bottom panel corre-
sponds to the case δG > δN)
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